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Online auctions have recently gained widespread popularity and are one of the most suc-
cessful forms of electronic commerce. We examine a dataset of eBay coin auctions to explore
features of online bidding and selling behavior. We address three main issues. First, we
measure the extent of the winner’s curse. We ﬁnd that for a representative auction in our
sample, a bidder’s expected proﬁts fall by 3.2 percent when the expected number of bidders
increases by one. Second, we document that costly entry is a key component in understanding
observed bidding behavior. For a representative auction in our sample, a bidder requires $3.20
of expected proﬁt to enter the auction. Third, we study the seller’s choice of reserve prices.
We ﬁnd that items with higher book value tend to be sold using a secret as opposed to posted
reserve price with a low minimum bid. We ﬁnd that this is, to a ﬁrst approximation, consistent
with maximizing behavior. We also develop new techniques for structurally estimating common
value auction models.
1 Introduction
Auctions have found their way into millions of homes with the recent proliferation of auction sites
on the Internet. The opportunity to study such online markets, especially the Web behemoth eBay,
is doubtlessly a golden one for economists. eBay is a source for a large amount of high quality data
and serves as a natural testing ground for existing theories of bidding and for market design issues
in auctions.
Auctions are clearly one of the leading innovations of Internet commerce. The Economist reports
that on a single day, eBay boasts some 2.4 million items for sale in over 1,500 unique categories
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ranging from beanie babies, to art, to used computers. On the surface, online auction markets,
such as eBay, appear to be a close approximation to an economist’s idealization of a frictionless,
competitive marketwhere a large number of buyers and sellers engage in trade. The eBay community
alone boasts some 3.8 million registered members.1
One factor that may inhibit eﬃcient trade is private information. In Akerlof’s celebrated lemon’s
example, hidden information can completely shut down markets. In an online auction, where items
of unknown quality are being traded, buyers need to worry about overpaying for goods. Economists
have recognized that there is a possibility of a winner’s curse in auctions, namely, that bidders win
items only because they pay too much. The winner’s curse is more severe as the number of bidders
becomes larger and, in a community of 3.8 million bidders, might be a factor that inhibits trade.
Recently, leading theorists have suggested that information asymmetries and the winner’s curse may
inhibit eﬃcient trade in online markets.2
One aim of this paper is to quantify the extent of the “winner’s curse” on eBay. To do this, we
chose the market for U.S. mint/proof coin sets. These coin sets are regarded as investment-grade
collectibles and are traded in liquid resale markets. Hence a strong “winner’s curse” eﬀect maybe
present in these auctions.
Another striking feature of auctions on eBay is that sellers are allowed some freedom in choosing
the rules of the auction. Economic theorists have spent a great deal of time analyzing incentives
and equilibrium under alternative auction rules. One form of rules we will focus on quite carefully
is the choice of reserve price policy.
In an auction, a reserve price is the price below which the auctioneer refuses to sell the item.
On eBay, we study two alternative forms of reserve prices. This ﬁrst is that the seller can set a
minimum bid for the auction, which is equivalent to what theorists typically call a posted reserve.
Second, for an additional fee, sellers can use a hidden reserve price so that bidders are aware that a
reserve is present, but do not know the value of the reserve at the time of bidding.
A large number of papers in economic theory, starting with Myerson (1981) and Milgrom and
Weber (1982), have studied equilibrium in auctions with reserve prices and characterized the optimal
reserve price policy. It can be shown that in the case of independent private values, the revenue
maximizing mechanism involves a non-zero reserve price. In many real world auctions, including
procurement, treasury bills, real estate and auction houses, both posted and hidden reserve prices
are commonly used.
Despite the widespread use of reserve prices, there is, to the best of our knowledge, no systematic
empirical work testing this large body of theory. The large volume of bidding data present on eBay
allows us to study the reserve prices sellers choose in the data to test the theory. We ﬁnd in the
data, somewhat surprisingly, that high value items tend to use a secret reserve price with a low
minimum bid while items with a low book value use only a posted reserve. There is no existing
1See The Economist, July 22, 1999, “The Heyday of the Auction.”
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theoretical model that has this prediction.
We believe the solution to the above puzzle relies on the fact that bidders choose which auction
to attend. Our data set indicates quite clearly that setting a high minimum bid (public reserve price)
deters bidders from participating in the auction. Studying the relationship between reserve prices
and entry, however, comes at a cost: we have to build a realistic model of bidding with endogenous
entry that we can take to the data.
The theoretical motivation for incorporating endogenous entry into models of bidding have
previously been pointed out by Harstad (1990), and Levin and Smith (1994): Most celebrated
results in auction theory, including the revenue ranking/equivalence theorems of Vickrey (1961),
Milgrom and Weber (1982), and the optimal mechanism design literature assume that the number
of bidders is ﬁxed across the mechanisms they compare. However, in a setting like eBay, auctions
of similar or even identical objects are listed side-by-side with diﬀering bidding rules. Therefore if
one set of auction rules promises higher expected proﬁt to bidders than another, we would expect
more bidders to enter the high-expected proﬁt auction than the other, to the point that bidder rents
are dissipated to a point of indiﬀerence. If there are enough potential bidders (millions on eBay),
this point of indiﬀerence will be the cost of entry, which might be the cost of determining a sensible
bid and the opportunity cost of time spent browsing the Internet. This means that not all bidder
surplus is appropriated by the seller in terms of bidding proceeds, and hence the seller’s revenue
might depend on the amount of entry induced by the mechanism.
Empirical literature on auctions also takes the number of bidders at an auction as exogenously
given. When, in the spirit of Paarsch (1992), Laﬀont, Ossard and Vuong (1995), or Elyakime,
Laﬀont, Loisel and Vuong (1994), we estimate the distribution of valuations of a set of bidders from
their observed bids, we implicitly condition on the fact that these bidders have rationally chosen to
enter the auction while others from a larger population of potential bidders have not. And when we
make policy recommendations based on these estimates, we typically assume that the same set of
bidders will participate in the modiﬁed mechanism. If, however, modifying the mechanism aﬀects
the entry decisions, this will no longer be true.
To our knowledge, the only empirical work that recognizes the importance of accounting for
endogenous entry is Paarsch (1997), who takes great care in identifying the set of potential bidders in
the timber sale auctions he studies, and thus can account for the valuations of those who decided not
to bid in a particular auction because they found the reserve price too high. We take Paarsch’s lead
further, and specify the process through which potential bidders enter the auction. Our structural
model is also much more demanding than Paarsch’s: whereas he focuses on the independent private
values model, we use a common value model.
Estimating a model with common values and endogenous entry posses several technical diﬃcul-
ties. First, no previous estimation procedures can clearly be applied to the modeling framework we
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that in the ﬁrst order conditions, bidders private information can be represented as a function of
the observed bid and the empirical probability distribution of bids. In our model, this condition
fails because the valuation of the highest bidder cannot be recovered from the data when only the
second highest price is observed. Another recent estimation procedure, suggested by Laﬀont et al.
(1995) uses the fact that the expected revenue in a ﬁrst price auction and second price auction are
the same to formulate a method of moments estimation procedure. Laﬀont et al. (1995) argue that
their procedure is desirable since it avoids the diﬃculty of computing equilibrium bid functions. In
the case of eBay, however, the result that expected revenue is identical under alternative auction
formats will fail because of the presence of common values.
The approach to estimation we take is most closely related to the work of Paarsch (1992) and
Bajari (1997). An important step in the estimation procedure is to calculate the equilibrium bid
functions eﬃciently. With common values, this may involve solving high dimensional integration
problems that are computationally burdensome. An innovation of this paper is to realize, that in
many cases, equilibrium bid function are “linearly scalable.” That is if we make a linear transforma-
tion of the underlying valuations, a linear transformation of the bid function will be an equilibrium
to the new game. This insight makes structural estimation of common value models computation-
ally feasible. It is worth noting, that this insight can be employed in structural estimation of many
other auction games, such a ﬁrst price sealed bid auctions with private or common values, where
computing the bid functions can be very expensive computationally.
Another problem for estimation of our model, as was ﬁrst recognized by Donald and Paarsch
(1993) is that the asymptotics for maximum likelihood estimation will not be straightforwardbecause
the support of the likelihood function depends on the parameter values. This is a generic problem
in auction models. This paper will utilize Bayesian methods proposed ﬁrst by Bajari (1997) to
overcome this diﬃculty. While the problem we study in this paper is bidding in eBay auctions, the
methods we propose are useful for estimation of other models that are diﬃcult to compute.
The auction model we estimate generalizes previous estimation strategies in two ways. First,
we are able to study a more general information structure in common value auctions. In Paarsch
(1992), for example, the author is not able to recover the distribution of the unobserved common
value component. This is because of the high dimensional integrals involved in computing the
equilibrium. Our approach allows for the recovery of this common value component. Second, we
estimate the unobserved entry process and its relation to the choice of minimum bid and reserve
price policy.
The outline of the paper is as follows: we ﬁrst give an overview of the market we’re studying
and present our data. We document several reduced form ﬁndings: bidding activity seems to be
concentrated at the end of the auction, there is signiﬁcant variation in the number of bidders who
attend the auction, reduced form bid functions are decreasing in the number of bidders and reserve
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sellers use secret reserves with low minimums for “big ticket” items and posted reserves for more
mundane objects. We also note that reserve prices, as well as the number of bidders are likely to
be endogenous and that compelling instruments do not exist. Therefore, we argue that a structural
approach will be required to answer certain questions.
Second, after examining the reduced form evidence, we argue that a common values model with
endogenous entry is the best description of the market that is computationally tractable. We derive
the equilibrium to the model and discuss its properties. Third, we specify a structural model and
describe how to estimate the model parameters.
Next, we summarize the parameter estimates from the structural model and discuss their eco-
nomic interpretation. We then use our structural model to study a set of policy questions. First we
measure the extent of the winner’s curse in the market. This allows us to assess the claims that have
been made by theorists that informational asymmetries may inhibit eﬃcient trade in online auctions.
Then we document that it is costly for bidders to enter the auction and measure the implicit costs
of entry in this model. Finally, we simulate the seller’s expected proﬁts under alternative reserve
price policies. We ﬁnd that, to a ﬁrst approximation, the observed behavior of the sellers appears
to be optimal.
2 Description of the market and data
eBay is the premier auction site on the Internet. Since it was launched in 1995, it has captured
a good share of the second-hand and collectible goods trade, and by the meteoric rise in its share
price, has become one of the most successful and popular Internet companies. Furthermore, with
thousands of browsable auctions closing each day, it is a goldmine for empirical research on auctions.
However, since most items on eBay are second-hand goods or collectibles, they are very diﬃcult to
appraise by a non-specialist economist, and hence empirical testing of results from auction theory
run into the diﬃculty of not being able to account for item-speciﬁc diﬀerences. Therefore, in this
research, we focus on a market segment where a little reading about the market and consulting
published price lists enable us to control for item-speciﬁc diﬀerences. This is the collectible coins
market, which we describe brieﬂy in the next section.
2.1 The collectible coins market
Coin collecting is a hobby with a long history and tradition. Aside from very rare coins from
antiquity that can command hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars, even relatively modern
coins ﬁnd a market among the millions of coin collectors in the U.S. Recently, the trade in collectible
coins has become an investment channel for many, especially after coins began to fetch astronomic
prices in the 80s. Although these prices have come down in the last decade, many coin traders can2 DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET AND DATA 6
be classiﬁed as speculators or at least collectors with strong investment motives. As such, the coin
market is an interesting cross between durable goods markets and securities markets, which, from
an auction theorists’ perspective, boils down to a cross between private values and common values.
The traditional channels for trade in coins are retail collectors’ shops or mail-order outlets.
Many dealers and experienced collectors also attend regional coin shows or private auctions. On-line
auction sites such as eBay are a promising new venue for coins trade; however, they still capture
only a small part of the coin trade.
For this study, we focus on collectible mint/proof sets. Mint sets have been prepared by the
Treasury for sale to collectors since 1947, and contain uncirculated specimens of each year’s coins
for every denomination issued from each mint. Proof sets are manufactured to have sharper details
and a more-than-ordinary brilliance than mint sets. They also contain one of each denomination
of the coins minted that year, and are once again sold directly from the government to collectors.
These sets have been sold since 1936, and usually command a higher price than mint sets.
Since both mint and proof coins are uncirculated, the proper grading of the coins becomes less of
an issue3, making them “well-deﬁned products” for which a non-coin collecting econometrician can
ﬁnd price lists, unlike some specialty coins that would require an expert to appraise. A drawback to
focusing on mint/proof sets is that post-1960 issues of these sets are fairly mundanely priced (some
as low as $5-$10), so the assumption of “bidder sophistication” may become somewhat suspect.
2.2 eBay auctions
Our data set contains the on-line auctions of U.S. mint/proof sets that were conducted between
September 28 and October 2, 1998 at the eBay on-line auction site. In that period, about 100
auctions closed every day, though the volume has since increased to about 400 auctions per day.
The auctions end 3, 5 or 7 days after they are listed. eBay only acts as an intermediary in these
trades and does not handle the physical delivery of the goods. eBay’s revenue comes from a ﬁxed
listing fee and a percentage of the transaction value if the auction is successful.
The bidding format used at eBay is a dynamic variant of the second-price sealed-bid auction,
called “proxy bidding.” Each bidder is asked to enter the maximum amount she is willing to pay.
The eBay computer compares this value to the valuations submitted by other bidders. In case it
is higher than existing valuations, the new bidder is designated as the “leading bidder.” However,
instead of the value entered by the bidder, only the amount that’s necessary to outbid the bidder
with the next highest value is displayed as the “leading bid.” This also becomes the amount the
bidder ends up paying if there are no other challengers. If the value is submitted by a new bidder
3According to the Oﬃcial Red Book, since 1959, mint sets have been sealed in a protective plastic envelope. Proof
sets also come in special plastic cases that protect them against tarnish. Some of the auction listings give additional
information about the condition of the original casing, sometimes the original envelope or the casing is damaged or
not available. But unless otherwise noted, the condition of the coins is taken to be “mint-state,” the highest grade
a coin can attain. We have also excluded reportedly self-assembled mint or proof sets, since these sets usually fetch
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is not high enough to lead the auction, or if the current auction leader is outbid, he’s notiﬁed by
e-mail and may revise his bid. Once an auction has concluded, the winner is notiﬁed by e-mail and
it is up to him to contact the seller to arrange shipment and payment details. Most of the auctions
that we study have shipping and handling fees preset by the seller, which is to be paid on top of the
bid amount.
A seller on eBay is constrained to use the proxy bidding method4, but has a few options to
customize the sale mechanism. She can set a minimum bid, or a secret reserve price5. The minimum
bid is observed by all bidders; however, in a secret reserve price auction, bidders are only told
whether the reserve price is met or not. The reserve price is not announced even after the auction
ends.
Aside from choosing whether to use a secret reserve price, the seller can also pay eBay to advertise
her auction as a “featured auction” for $99.95 or a “category-featured auction” for $14.95. None of
the auctions in our dataset were featured auctions, which is understandable since the average value
of the coins were about $25.
Sellers can also diﬀerentiate themselves through eBay’s innovative buyer/seller feedback system.
eBay allows the buyer and the seller to rate their counterparts in transactions. The rating is in the
form of a positive, negative or neutral response. Next to each buyer or seller’s ID (which is usually
a pseudonym or an e-mail address), the number of net positive responses is displayed. In order to
prevent planted responses, only unique responses are factored into the reputation rating.
In addition to data downloadable from eBay pages, we found the book values for the auctioned
items from the November 1998 issue of Coins magazine, which collects value estimates from coin
dealers and coin auctions around the U.S.6
For each auction we collected the following variables:
1. SECRET: 1 for a secret reserve price auction, 0 if not.
2. SALE: 1 if the auction was successful, 0 if not.
3. BOOKVAL: bookvalue of object according to Coins magazine.
4. SHIPHAND: Shipping and handling fee (if reported by seller).
5. BLEMISH: 1 if the seller reports that there’s a blemish in the object.
6. OVERALL: Overall reputation of seller (number of unique positive responses - number of
unique negative responses).
7. NEGATIVE: Number of unique negative responses to seller.
4“Dutch auctions” for the sale of multiple objects are also allowed, but we exclude such auctions from our study.
5The seller can still set a minimum bid in a secret reserve price auction.
6The November issue of the magazine was bought by one of the authors on October 22nd. We conﬁrmed by
e-maling the magazine that the prices quoted were market prices of mid-October. This is a reasonable time frame for
resale, taking into account that it usually takes a week for the buyer to get the coins from a seller on Ebay.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET AND DATA 8
8. NBIDDER: Number of bidders.
9. AVGNBID is the average of bids in an auction as a percentage of bookvalue (conditional on
there being at least one bidder).
10. DISPERSION is the diﬀerence between the maximum and the minimum bid as a percentage
of bookvalue.
11. AVGFRAC is the average of bid submission times (as a fraction of auction duration).
12. AVGEXP is the average experience of bidders as measured by the number of previous trans-
actions conducted on eBay.
13. MINBID: The minimum bid as set by the seller.
14. BID1N: The winning bid as a percentage of bookvalue (conditional on sale).
15. REVENUE: Revenue as a percentage of bookvalue (not conditional on sale).
16. BID1-BID25: Reported bids - which for every bidder except the winner corresponds to the
submitted bid. BID1 is the amount paid by the winner, which is the bid increment plus the
second bid. The bids are ranked in descending order.
17. FRAC1-FRAC25: Timing of ﬁnal bid updates7 - as a fraction of the total auction duration.
18. PREWIN1- PREWIN25: Previous wins of the bidder in eBay auctions - we use this variable
as a proxy for bidder experience.
There were a total of 516 auctions completed in the mint-proof category in the ﬁve day sample
we consider. We could not ﬁnd reliable book values for 48 of the auctions and since the book value
serves as our primary controlling variable for cross-object heterogeneity, we had to discard those
observations from our data set (we checked whether this truncation makes any diﬀerence in the
observed entry/reserve price setting behavior and could not ﬁnd a noticeable pattern). 11 auctions
were conducted as Dutch auctions and since those auctions are subject to a diﬀerent set of rules,
were omitted from our analysis. Detailed bid histories for 39 auctions were lost due to a technical
error in data transfer. Aside from those, our dataset contains the entire set of mint-proof set auctions
conducted during the dates considered.
We report summary statistics on the above variables in Table 1. We see that 85% of the auctions
resulted in a sale, with an average of 3 bidders per auction. The average value of the traded coins is
$47, with a $2shipping and handling charge. The coins range from $3 to $3700 in value, reﬂecting
the wide dispersion of prices even within this relative narrow section of the collectible coin market.
10% of the coin sets had reported blemishes.
7Bidders have the ability to update their bids during the auction. What we have available in the “bid-history”
pages on Ebay are the ﬁnal bids by each buyer and the last time they updated their bids.2 DESCRIPTION OF THE MARKET AND DATA 9
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
SECRET .1606 .3676 0 1
SALE .8513 .3571 0 1
BOOKVAL 47.51 212.63 3 3700
SHIPHAND 2.18 .92 1 5
BLEMISH .10 .32 0 1
OVERALL 203.06 208.43 0 973
NEGATIVE .43 1.63 0 21
NBIDDER 3.05 2.46 0 14
AVGNBID 0.8354 0.2616 0.16 1.2824
DISPERSION 0.3215 0.2826 0 1.2333
AVGFRAC .70 .25 0 1
AVGEXP 41.22 38.40 0 261.5
MINBID 16.28 28.59 .01 230
BID1N 0.9556 0.2820 0.1600 1.4767
REVENUE 0.8135 0.4284 0 1.4767
BID1 36.70 168.94 0 3010
Conditional on sale, revenues are 5% lower than the reported book values of the sample. However,
not all items ended up being sold, so the expected average revenue from an auction, considering the
possibility of no sale, was 81% of the bookvalue. The average bid in an auction was 83% of the
bookvalue and the mean bid spread was 32% of the book value. There were quite a few outliers in
the data: in 20 auctions, the winning bid was 50% above the bookvalue and in 5 auctions (all were
posted reserve auctions), the winning bid was less than half the bookvalue.8
As for bidder and seller characteristics, we see that the average bidder has previously won 41
auctions and the average seller has done at least 203 transactions on eBay. Negative feedback points
are very low compared to the positive feedback points of the sellers.9 We conclude from these
observations that eBay is not just a marketplace for occasional hobbyists and that serious collectors
and coin dealers are also participants.
8We checked these outliers to make sure there was not an error in coding the bookvalue. It’s also interesting to
note that 3 of the 5 low revenue auctions had more than one bidder.
9The maximum negative rating of 21 corresponds to the seller with the seller with 973 overall feedback points.3 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 10
3 Empirical regularities
In this section we report empirical regularities we observe in the data that we deem signiﬁcant in
formulating a model of bidding on eBay. We summarize the main ﬁndings of this section as the
following:
1. We ﬁnd that bidders update their bids frequently and that bidding activity is concentrated
at the end of the auction. We also ﬁnd that bid levels decline in the number of bidders in an
auction. We conclude that a private values framework can not explain this kind of behavior
and that a common values framework, with a potential “winner’s curse” eﬀect is better suited
to model the auctions in our sample.
2. There is signiﬁcant variation in the number of bidders in an auction. We ﬁnd that a low
minimum bid, a high bookvalue and low negative ratings increase entry to an auction.
3. Proﬁt margins for bidders are slim and do not deviate signiﬁcantly from book values of the
coins once shipping and handling costs are accounted for.
4. The number of bids submitted in the auction is decreasing in the ratio of the minimum bid to
the book value.
5. Sets with a high book value tend to be auctioned using a secret reserve price with a minimum
bid that is signiﬁcantly lower than the book value. Less expensive sets are auctioned using a
posted reserve price with a higher minimum bid to book ratio.
6. Experience does not appear to play a signiﬁcant role in bidding.
3.1 Private vs. common values and the winner’s curse
How do bidders on eBay value the coin sets they are bidding on? One answer to this question is to
say that each bidder (indexed by i) gets utility vi from winning the coin set. If the bidder i knows
vi (but not necessarily the v’s of other bidders) we have the case of “private values.”
“Private values” may make sense if the bidder is buying the coin set as a part of a collection.
However, the existence of an active secondary market in collectible coins makes it quite plausible for
bidders to have a resale incentive. The frequent activity of individual bidders on eBay suggests that
quite a few of them could be dealers who make a living from buying and selling coins. If resale is
the primary incentive, we can argue that all bidders get the same utility from winning the coin set;
namely the resale value of the coin set. Here, vi = v, the same number across all bidders. This is
the case of (symmetric) “common values.”
The problem with the “common values” case is that, typically the “resale” value v is not known
by the bidders. Rather than observing v, each bidder instead comes up with an “estimate” xi, and3 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 11
bases her bid on this estimate. We can model this estimate as having the form xi = v+εi,w i t hεi as
a noise term. Now let’s think whether a bidder would care to know about other bidders’ estimates.
If a bidder believes that εi is truly an idiosyncratic noise term, then she can reduce the uncertainty
of her estimate by averaging across all estimates. Through this averaging, a high estimate of the
value of the object will be adjusted downwards, and a low estimate would be adjusted upwards.
Unfortunately, bidders rarely share their estimates. Here’s where the “winner’s curse” comes in:
a bidder realizes that, conditional on winning, she must have had the highest estimate.10 Therefore,
with some probability, she will have paid too much for the item. Observe that there is no room for
a “winner’s curse” in the private values setting. Each bidder is sure of the utility she will get from
winning the auction, and does not have worry about whether she has understated or overstated this
number11.
The “winner’s curse” becomes worse as the number of bidders increases. The highest estimate
among 15 bidders is very likely to be even higher than the highest estimate among 2bidders.
Therefore, we would expect bidders to be more afraid of a “winner’s curse in a 15 person auction
than in a 2person auction; hence we would expect lower bids in a 15 person auction than in a 2
bidder auction12.
As ﬁrst pointed out by Paarsch (1992), this last observation allows us to distinguish between
a common values vs. a private values setting. Within the context of a second price auction or an
ascending bid auction, such as the eBay auction, the number of bidders would have no eﬀect on bids
in a private values setting, since the dominant strategy in these auctions is to bid one’s valuation.
However, as will be noted more formally in the theory section, the common value model of eBay
auctions predicts that bids will unambiguously decrease with an increase in the number of bidders.
To perform this test on our data set, we report in table 2the regression of bids normalized by
book value (b) on the realized number of bidders (N). We use the linear, quadratic and logarithmic
speciﬁcations of Paarsch (1992) to check the robustness of our results. We see that for each speciﬁ-
cation, there is a signiﬁcant negative relationship between the number of bidders and the normalized
bid. This suggests the presence of common values over private values.
We also deﬁne the following measure for the winner’s curse: the “winner’s curse eﬀect” is the
percentage decline in bids in response to one additional bidder in the auction. If we take the linear
10To see why this is so, think of the case when each bidders estimate is unbiased. The unconditional mean of each
estimate will be v, but the mean of the estimate conditional on the fact that it is the “maximum among n”e s t i m a t e s
will be greater than v.
11could argue that even in a private values setting, bidders do not observe vi until they receive the coin set and
hence bid on the basis of an estimate xi = vi +εi. If the noise term i is independent across bidders, then bidders have
nothing to learn from other people’s estimates, and there is no room for a “winner’s curse.” If, however, the noise
term is somehow correlated across bidders, then a “winner’s curse” still exists. Observe that this is observationally
equivalent to a setting where the bidders valuation for the object has both a private and a common value component,
where the private value component is ui and the bidder makes an estimate, χi = v + ξi about the unknown common
value v with noise ξi (i.e. xi = ui + v + ξi, with the correlation captured by v).
12Though we could also expect that bidders would increase their bids in the face of increased competition, and that
the eﬀect of increasing the number of bidders on bid levels would be ambiguous. We will resolve this ambiguity in
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Table 2: Regression of bid/bookval on the number of bidders
.
Speciﬁcation Linear Quadratic Logarithmic
b = β0 + β1N b = β0 + β1N + β2N2 ln(b)=β0 + β1 lnN
β0 .9836 (.0202) 1.0932(.0354) -.0420 (.033)
β1 -.0342(.0035) -.0804 (.0128) -.0572(.005)
β2 N/A .0038 (.0010) N/A
R2 0.0625 0.072 0.065
model at face value, the “winner’s curse eﬀect” can be quantiﬁed at about 3.4% of the bookvalue
per additional bidder.
An important criticism that could be made of the regressions in Table 2is that the number of
bidders who participate in an auction is very likely to be endogenous. If the number of bidders is
correlated with attributes of the auction that we have failed to model in our simple speciﬁcation,
then the estimate of the slope coeﬃcient will be biased, making it diﬃcult to assess the extent of the
winner’s curse from the above speciﬁcation. Unfortunately, it is hard to think of natural instruments
for the number of bidders, since factors correlated with the number of bidders should also enter into
the distribution of valuations. We therefore take the evidence in table 2as suggestive, as opposed
to conclusive, about the impact of the number of bidders on the bid/bookval ratio. Also, in eBay,
it is very hard for a bidder to know exactly how many competitors she is facing (since almost all the
action transpires at the end of the auction); so the number of bidders we observe might not be the
number of bidders that the bidder had in mind when forming her bid. We will attempt to address
these issues more completely in sections 4 and 5 where we build and estimate a structural model of
price formation in eBay.
We should note that on eBay there is an even simpler test to distinguish between a private values
and a common values environment. Recall that in the “proxy-bidding” system, bidders can observe
the bids of others at least until the very end of the auction and have the option to update their bids.
The dominant strategy in this auction in a private values environment is to bid one’s valuation,
therefore it does not matter when a bid is placed. Furthermore, once a bid, presumably equal to
the valuation of the bidder, is placed, it should not be necessary to change it.
Our data rejects both predictions of the private values setting. First, as we will show below, the
bids are lumped disproportionately at the end of the auction. So it does matter when the bids are
placed. In fact, we will show that bidding at the last minute turns out to be an equilibrium strategy
under the common values model. Second, we ﬁnd that bidders routinely update their bids. In our
data, we can also observe how many total bids were submitted throughout the auction. In the set
of auctions we consider, bidders submit on average 5.2bids. With an average 3 bidders per auction,
this means that almost every bidder updates her bid once.3 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 13
3.2 Timing of bids
Figure 1 is a histogram of ﬁnal bid submission times.13 As one can see, more than 50% of ﬁnal bids
are submitted after 90% of the auction duration has passed. This corresponds to the last 7 hours of
the auction in a 3 day auction. About 32% of the bids are submitted after 97% of the auction has
passed, that is, the last 2hours of a 3 day auction.
The winning bids tend to come even later.14 The median winning bid arrives after 98.3% of the
auction time has elapsed (within the last 73 minutes of a 3 day auction), and 25% of the winning
bids arrived after 99.8% of the auction time elapsed (the last 8 minutes of a 3 day auction).
The evidence shows that bidding activity is concentrated at the very end of the auction. As we
explained in the section regarding common vs. private values, this ﬁnding can not be consistent
with the presence of private values.
It is interesting to note that a private values framework is what eBay tries to instill in the bidders
in its online bidding manual: in eBay’s explanation of the proxy bidding system, the bidders are
urged to decide on their private value, submit it online and wait until the conclusion of the auction.
It is quite clear from the above evidence that bidders do not abide by eBay’s recommendation, and,
as we will show in section 4, with good reason.
3.3 Entry
Since the previous section revealed that the number of competitors in an auction is an important
determinant of bid levels, we ask the following question: what attracts bidders into an auction? In
Table 3, we run a regression of the number of bidders on the minimum bid (normalized over book
value), the reserve price policy (SECRET is a dummy for secret reserve price policy), the bookvalue
of the item, and the negative reputation of the seller.
The minimum bid seems to be the single most important determinant of entry in our sample,
regardless of there being a secret reserve price or not. The diﬀerence between setting the minimum
bid equal to the bookvalue and at zero is almost 4 more bidders in the auction!
This ﬁnding is driven by the fact that the minimum bid censors the distribution of bidder
valuations we observe. As we shall discuss below, in a common values setting, we will not observe
bids from bidders whose signals are below a “screening-level,” which is strictly above the minimum
bid. The negative coeﬃcient on the minbid/book could be due to two reasons. The ﬁrst is we observe
fewer bidders in the data because the reserve exceeded the bidder’s maximum willingness to pay. A
second is that high reserves discourage bidders from even attending the auction and investigating
the value of the object. While this distinction may seem trivial at ﬁrst, a number of theorists,
including Harstad (1990) and Levin and Smith (1994) have argued that correctly accounting for the
potential number of bidders is key in assessing the relationship between reserve prices and seller
13Recall that we track only the ﬁnal bids of each bidder.
14The winning bid is not necessarily the latest.3 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 14
Table 3: Regression of the number of bidders on auction speciﬁc variables
NBIDDER Coef. Std. Err. t-stat
(MINBID/BOOK)*SECRET -3.7875 1.8886 -3.187
(MINBID/BOOK)*(1-SECRET) -3.6767 .2378 -15.457
SECRET .3840 .4752 0.808
LN(BOOK) .4576 .0934 4.894
BLEMISH -.1354 .3077 -0.440
NEGATIVE -.1562 .0542 -2.879
CONSTANT 4.1218 .3368 12.239
R2 0.5009
revenue. We will emphasize this distinction while building our structural model in sections 4 and 5,
where we ﬁnd correctly accounting for the potential number of participants is key in understanding
how sellers set their reserve prices.
We also ﬁnd that the existence of a secret reserve price does not aﬀect entry signiﬁcantly. All
things being equal, one might expect that a secret reserve price should deter entry, for rational
bidders should realize that their chance of winning an auction with a secret reserve price is lower.
The above ﬁnding appears to point out that either bidders’ expectation of the secret reserve price,
or that the cost of preparing and submitting a bid is low enough that it is worthwhile for bidders to
enter an auction that they will most likely not win.
Aside from reserve price/minimum bid policy, the bookvalue also appears as a signiﬁcant de-
terminant of entry; however, the parameter estimate in Table 3 means that a ten-fold increase in
bookvalue is needed to add another bidder to the auction. Also, a seller with negative feedback
attracts fewer bidders (7 or 8 negative comments drive away one bidder).
Given that the minimum bid is by far the most important determinant of entry, what does the
seller’s choice of a minimum bid depend on? In table 4, we regress the minimum bid (normalized
over book value) on SECRET, BLEMISH and the natural logs of OVERALL (which we take as a
proxy for seller experience), NEGATIVE and BOOKVAL . We ﬁnd that the seller’s experience or
reputation do not aﬀect the choice of minimum bid. However, the minimum bid is decidedly lower
if the seller is running a secret reserve price auction, or if the seller is running an ordinary (no secret
reserve price) auction with a high book value.
One way to interpret the results in Table 4 is to say that sellers of high book value items are
willing to risk selling the item for a low price in order to induce entry to their auctions. Their hope
is that after at least two bidders have entered the auction, the bidding will reach a competitive level,
provided that both bidders have valuations that are close to the book value of the item.
This argument is only true to a certain extent, however. For high book value items, sellers3 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 15
Table 4: Regression of minimum bid levels on auction speciﬁc regressors
.
MINBID/BOOK Coef. Std. Err. t-stat
LN(OVERALL) -.000376 .0158 -0.024
LN(NEGATIVE) -.03754 .0408 0.920
LN(BOOK)*SECRET -.01376 0.028 -0.479
LN(BOOK)*(1-SECRET) -.1102 .02611 -4.221
SECRET -.6531 .1406 -4.644
BLEMISH -.1033 .0646 -1.598
CONSTANT .9960 .1078 9.085
R2 0.1668
Table 5: Quantiles of Book Value Across Auction Formats









overwhelmingly favor a secret reserve price auction over an ordinary auction, as seen in Table 5.
Conducting a secret reserve price auction allows the seller to set a low minimum bid to attract
entry, at the same time ensuring a high price conditional upon sale15. Unfortunately eBay does not
divulge the secret reserve prices, therefore we can not compare the secret reserve price to minimum
bid levels in ordinary auctions; however, the fact that far fewer secret reserve price auctions result
in a sale (50% vs. 84%) indicate that secret reserve price levels are higher than the minimum bids
in ordinary auctions.
If secret reserve price auctions allow a seller to extract higher prices without discouraging entry,
then why don’t we see more frequent use of this mechanism (only 16% of the auctions have a secret
reserve price)? One answer to this question is that eBay charges sellers an extra $1 for conducting
a secret reserve price auction. This fee is refundable upon sale; however, one can see that the fee
is designed to prevent sellers from setting a high reserve price and continually relisting their item
15In fact we have conﬁrmed the use of this intuition by tuning into some bidder discussion groups on the eBay site.3 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 16
until a transaction occurs. Thus, for $5 items it might not pay to use a secret reserve price, but for
bigger-ticket items, the additional cost might be worth the revenue improvement16.
We should note that the above intuition runs counter to the only result we have been able to
ﬁnd in the auction theory literature regarding the use of secret reserve prices: Elyakime et al. (1994)
prove that in a private values framework, making the reserve price public always yields the seller
higher revenue than when it is secret. However, Elyakime et al. (1994) do not incorporate the eﬀect
of endogenous entry in their results. It is also conceivable that in a common value setting, a diﬀerent
conclusion might arise. Although we do not know of any general result concerning the beneﬁts/costs
of using secret reserve prices, the structural model that we build in the sections 4 and 5 allows us
to simulate the eﬀects of diﬀerent reserve price policies on seller revenues.
3.4 Revenues, proﬁt margins and values
The summary statistics in Table 1 reveal that the average revenue (BID1) in the auctions are lower
than the average book value of the object being sold. The average revenue (as a percentage of book
value) conditional on sale is 95.8%. Keeping in mind that some auctions did not result in a sale, the
unconditional revenue is 81.3%.
In table 6, we deﬁne REVN to be the normalized revenue of the item and regress it on the same
set of regressors as in the entry regression. We ﬁnd that an increase in the number of bidders and
in the minimum bid increase the revenue and that reported blemishes decrease revenue. Auction
type, seller’s negative reputation, the average experience of bidders, and the experience level of the
winning bidder are not signiﬁcant determinants of revenue.
The average proﬁt margin of the bidders (taking the book value as the true value of the item) is
4.2% (with a standard deviation of 30.1%). However, this does not take the shipping and handling
costs in to account. As we noted in the data section, we have data on only about a third of the
sample on the shipping and handling terms. The average proﬁt margin net of shipping and handling
costs on this sub-sample is -16.2% (std. 37.3%). Using the average shipping and handling cost of
$2.18 in Table 1 for the entire sample, we ﬁnd that the net proﬁt margin is -15.4% (std. 36.4%).
However, since the standard deviations are very large and the estimates are highly dependent on
our measurement of the book value, these ﬁgures should be taken with a great deal of skepticism.17
What values do bidders assign on the coins for sale? The revenue regression above gives a biased
answer to this question, since revenue is the second highest bid in the auction. Even if we believe
a private values framework, in which bids are equal to the valuation, we can not answer general
16Then why do we see a secret reserve price for a $4 auction? We found that all except one of the sub-$10 secret
reserve price auctions ended in sale. Hence we conclude that the seller held the reserve price low enough to ensure the
refund of the $1 fee. We also found that two sellers account for most of the sub- $10 auctions that were conducted
with a secret reserve price. These sellers conducted all of their auctions, some with much higher book values, as secret
reserve price auctions.
17For example, if we use the median value of the net proﬁt margin as our summary statistic, we get -1.5% proﬁt
net of shipping and handling .3 EMPIRICAL REGULARITIES 17
Table 6: Regression of revenue/bookvalue on auction speciﬁc variables
REVN Coef. Std. Err. t-stat
NBIDDER .0356 .0071 4.988
MINBID/BOOK .1833 .0339 5.396
SECRET .0078 .0446 0.176
BLEMISH -.1286 .0493 -2.605
NEGATIVE -.0021 .0080 -0.267
AVGEXP -.0004 .0004 1.001
PREWIN1 -0.0002 .0003 -0.570
CONSTANT .7431 .0438 16.932
R2 0.3327
Table 7: Regression of normalized bids on auction speciﬁc variables
.
BIDN Coef. Std. Err. t-stat
MINBID/BOOK .44316 .0239 18.434
SECRET -.0294 .0185 -1.584
BLEMISH -.0956 .0249 -3.828
NEGATIVE -.0047 .0055 0.851
PREWIN 0.00028 .00012 2.365
CONSTANT .6214 .0149 41.581
R2 0.2569
questions about the valuation of the objects just by looking at the revenue, since revenue is the
second-order statistic of the valuation distribution.
Table 7 is the regression of individual bids (normalized over book value) on the regressors in
Table 4. We see that once again the minimum bid enters as a signiﬁcant determinant of overall bids.
A reported blemish in the item reduces the bids by 10%. Bidder experience also enters as a weak,
but signiﬁcant factor in determining bid levels.
A straightforward but misleading conclusion from the regressions in Table 6 and Table 7 is to
say that revenue and bids increase with the minimum bid. It is easy to see why the conclusion is
misleading for the regression table 6: the bids in this regression are observed conditional on the fact
that they exceed the minimum bid. Hence, the coeﬃcient on MINBID is subject to selection bias
because only bidders with a high willingness to pay for the object will choose to participate in the
auction. While the results of this regression are suggestive, we will need to build a structural model
in order to consistently estimate the relationship between the reserve price and the bids submitted
in the auction.4 A MODEL OF BIDDING IN EBAY COIN AUCTIONS 18
3.5 Bidder experience
A breakdown of bidder experience measured by number of auctions previously won at eBay reveals
a very heterogeneous bidder population (ranging from ﬁrst time participants to a bidder who has
won 557 auctions) with the median bidder having 21 previous wins. However, as was noted in the
last section, neither the average experience level of the bidders in an auction, nor the experience
of the winning bidder seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the revenue of the seller. Also, as seen
on Table 5, experience actually has a very weak positive eﬀect on individual bids, i.e. experienced
bidders tend to bid higher than inexperienced bidders.
These results point out that despite the heterogeneity of the bidder population, informational
asymmetries or diﬀering degrees of bidder sophistication are not likely to be signiﬁcant issues in
this setting. Therefore we will refrain from incorporating ex-ante informational asymmetries in our
model.
4 A model of bidding in eBay coin auctions
In this section, we develop a model of bidding in eBay coin auctions that we believe captures the
main ﬁndings of last section and that will allow us to further our ability to understand observed
bidding behavior. In the next section, we embed this model in an econometric procedure to estimate
its exogenous parameters. This requires that we impose structure onto the bidding process. We
understand that it is diﬃcult for a theoretical model to capture the complexity and idiosyncracy
of actual bidder behavior. However, the imposed structure is necessary to answer the following
questions without ambiguity:
1. What is the informational environment that rationalizes observed bidder behavior? We sug-
gested in the previous section that there is evidence against a private values framework; how-
ever, even in a common values framework, we still need to answer the following questions:
What does the common value depend on? How diﬀuse are the bidders’ information? It is very
diﬃcult to interpret the regression results in the previous section to get good answers to these
questions, since the data suﬀers from both an endogeneity bias due to the endogenous nature
of entry, and a truncation due to the minimum bid level. What is needed is a speciﬁcation that
accounts for the fact that entry is endogenous, and that some potential bids are unobserved
due to the minimum bid.
2. Another question of use to users of eBay that emerged in the previous section is the following:
How does the choice of a minimum bid and/or a secret reserve price aﬀect the revenues of a
seller? Although our results in section 3.2seem to indicate that, at least beyond a certain
book value, a secret reserve price auction might be more advantageous to the seller, we also
pointed out that there is no known theoretical justiﬁcation for why this should be true. Our4 A MODEL OF BIDDING IN EBAY COIN AUCTIONS 19
structural estimates allow us to simulate the revenue eﬀects using a secret reserve over a public
reserve price and to answer this question unambiguously.
Our model assumptions are based on the empirical ﬁndings from the previous sections. Hence
our model includes a common value element. We also account for the fact that the number of
bidders in an auction is a random variable whose realization depends strongly on auction speciﬁc
observables, most importantly, the minimum bid level. In doing so, we assume that the bidders are
ex-ante symmetric, as bidder experience was not found to be a signiﬁcant determinant of bidding
behavior.
In what follows, we ﬁrst specify a stochastic entry process motivated by the regression in Table
3. We then focus on the bidding game conditional on entry. We argue that the eBay auction,
despite its ascending nature, diﬀers signiﬁcantly from the ascending auction models investigated in
the theoretical literature. Instead of capturing the full dynamic nature of the game, we point out
that there exists no symmetric equilibrium of the game in which the observable actions of bidders
can fully reveal their private information. Moreover, we demonstrate that there exists a symmetric
equilibrium in which bidders choose to reveal no information at all, i.e. they all wait until the very
end of the auction18. In this equilibrium, bids can be modeled as coming from a sealed-bid second
price auction, for which the well-known results of Milgrom and Weber (1982) apply. Our equilibrium
analysis also incorporates the stochastic nature of the entry process.
4.1 Model primitives
We assume that the number of bidders in auction t is a Poisson random variable, with rate λt,
which depends on the regressors in Table 3. The Poisson random variable arises as the limiting
distribution of a sum of independent Bernoulli random variables, each with small probability of
success. Since there are millions of users on eBay and thousands of coin collectors browsing auction
listings everyday, of which only a few decide to bid in a given auction, we believe the Poisson
speciﬁcation is appropriate in this setting.
We assume that bidders are risk neutral expected utility maximizers. We eschew any dynamic
considerations that bidders might have and assume that they focus entirely on the auction at hand19.
To model the information structure, we assume the symmetric common value setting of Wilson
(1977). That is, there is an unknown common value,v of the coin being auctioned, which is dis-
tributed according to fv(v) over the support [v
¯
, ¯ v]. Since the collectible coins market is characterized
by frequent buying and selling, v can represent the unknown resale value of the item. We assume
that the prior belief about the distribution of the common value is shared by all bidders.
18This mode of bidding is also called “sniping.” It is interesting to note that there exist shareware programs
downloadable from the Web to facilitate such last-minute bids.
19We also recognize, but do not model the fact that on eBay similar objects are often being sold side-by-side and
that someone in the market for a certain coin can “smooth” her strategies across diﬀerent auctions.4 A MODEL OF BIDDING IN EBAY COIN AUCTIONS 20
Given the particular realization of the common value, which is unobserved, bidder i receives a
signal xi which is distributed according to fx(xi|v) over the support [x
¯
, ¯ x]. We assume that condi-
tional on v, xi are identically and independently distributed and the distribution of bidder signals is
common knowledge to all bidders.20 We also assume that fx(xi|v) satisﬁes the monotone likelihood
ratio property of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and hence the signals are aﬃliated21.
4.2 Bidding
4.2.1 Auction format
eBay uses an open ascending auction format. However, the exact format does not ﬁt neatly under
the category of “open-exit English auctions” studied by Milgrom and Weber (1982), in which the
auctioneer raises the price of the object until all but one of the bidders has dropped out. A bidder
can not rejoin the auction once she has dropped out. The key to the analysis in Milgrom and Weber
(1982) is that the drop-out decision of a particular bidder conveys information to other bidders, who
will update their estimate of the item’s true worth and will change their drop-out points. Hence
bidding strategy in this type of an ascending auction diﬀers from that in a sealed-bid auction.
However, in eBay agents have the opportunity to update their bids and rejoin the race anytime
before the auction ends. With the option to revise one’s bid, bidders might not be able to infer
others’ valuations by observing their drop-out decisions, since “drop-outs” can be insincere. In fact,
we will show that there is a Nash equilibrium in which the eBay auction is equivalent to a sealed-bid
second-price auction.
To make the above argument more formal, let us view the eBay auction as a two stage auction.
Taking the total auction time to be T, the ﬁrst stage auction is an open-exit ascending auction
played until T − ε,w h e r eε   T 22. The drop-out points in this auction are openly observed by all
bidders, who will be ordered by their drop-out points in the initial auction, θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ .... ≤ θn,w i t h
only θn unobservable (bidders can only infer that it is higher than θn−1). The second stage of the
auction transpires from T − ε to T,and is conducted as a sealed bid second price auction in which
every bidder, including those who dropped out in the ﬁrst stage, are given the option to submit a
bid, b. The highest bidder in the second stage auction wins the object.
This model of the eBay auction captures the ability of bidders to revise their bids. It also
is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that quite a few ﬁnal bids are submitted within the last
minutes of the auction . As our experience as bidders on eBay show, the last minutes of the auction
20Observe that this speciﬁcation of the common value environment is entirely analogous to that in Section 3.1.
21Brieﬂy, aﬃliation implies that if v  >vand xi >x j,then fx(xi|v )fx(xj|v) >f x(xi|v)fx(xj|v ). Roughly, this
means that signals are positively correlated: a high signal for a bidder makes high values for other bidders’ signals
more likely.
22ε is the time frame in which bidders on Ebay can not update their bids in response to others. This can be on the
order of 5-10 minutes, or even longer; as one of the authors had the unpleasant experience of receiving the notiﬁcation
that he was outbid about 2 days after an auction closed.4 A MODEL OF BIDDING IN EBAY COIN AUCTIONS 21
do resemble a sealed bid auction more than an ascending auction, since delays in e-mail transmission
and on the eBay server may make it diﬃcult to follow the bidding in real time23.
Given the above setup, we make the following claim:
Proposition 1 The ﬁrst stage drop-out points θi,i=1 ,...,n can not be of the form θ(xi), a mono-
t o n i cf u n c t i o ni nb i d d e ri’s signal.
Proof 1 Suppose θi = θ(xi) a monotonic function in xi. Then, since θ(.) is invertible, at the
beginning of the second stage of the auction, the signals of bidders i =1 ,..,n − 1 become common
knowledge. Then, the second stage bid functions will be the expected value of the object given the
information available to the bidders24:
bi =n =m a x {θi,E[v|x1 = θ−1(θ1),...,xn−1 = θ−1(θn−1),x n ≥ θ−1(θn−1)}
bn =m a x {θn,E[v|x1 = θ
−1(θ1),...,xn−1 = θ
−1(θn−1),x n = xn}
Observe that this results in identical bids for bidders i  = n, provided that their signals are high
enough, since they all form the same expectation of the common value. The expectation formed by
the highest bidder in the ﬁrst stage is a little diﬀerent, since she knows her own value with certainty.
In this situation, there is a proﬁtable deviation. If bidder j decreases her drop-out point in the
ﬁrst stage to ˆ θj <θ j, then in the second stage
bi =j(ˆ θj) ≤ bi =j(θj)
since the conditional expectations are decreasing in θj by Milgrom and Weber (1982) ’s Theorem
5. But since all other bidders are bidding sincerely in the ﬁrst stage, j’s bid will not change, and
she will unilaterally increase her probability of winning the auction.
If the bidders can not bid sincerely in the ﬁrst stage of the auction, then the ascending auction
aspect of eBay leads to less information revelation than in the models of ascending auctions in
Milgrom and Weber (1982), Wilson (1995) and the structural econometric model of Hong and Shum
(1997). In fact, the following result reveals that the eBay auction format might not have any
advantages over a sealed bid second price auction:
Proposition 2 Bidding 0 (or not bidding at all) in the ﬁrst stage of the auction and participating
only in the second stage of the auction is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the eBay auction. In this
case the eBay auction is equivalent to a sealed bid second price auction.
23Visitors to eBay can attest to the fact that navigation can be quite slow at times.
24Since bidders are risk neutral, this follows from exactly the same argument behind sincere bidding in private
value second price auctions: if, given the information available, I bid higher than my conditional expectation of the
value of the item, then on average, I make a loss. If, on the other hand, I bid lower than my conditional expectation,
then I lower the probability I will win, but since my payment does not change (since it is the bid of the second highest
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Proof 2 Bidding 0 in the ﬁrst stage reveals nothing about a bidder’s signal in the ﬁrst stage. There-
fore the second stage is just a sealed bid second price auction, where each bidder knows only her
own signal. In this case, the symmetric equilibrium bid function, as derived by Milgrom and Weber
(1982), is b(x)=v(x,x), where v(x,y)=E[v|xi = x,yi = y],w i t hyi =m a x j∈{1,...,n}\i{xj}.T or u l e
out proﬁtable deviations, observe the following: if bidder j were to bid θj > 0,then it would be evident
that xj > 0, and since signals are aﬃliated, E[v|xi = x,yi = x,xj > 0] ≥ E[v|xi = x,yi = x],s o
bidder j would unilaterally decrease her probability of winning25.
The main drawback of the above analysis is that our data reveals that bidders on eBay do not
necessarily follow this equilibrium. This is not very surprising, because aside from this one symmetric
equilibrium, there might exist many asymmetric equilibria. However, the main point of our logic
is clear: there is no symmetric equilibrium of the eBay auction where bidders can learn much from
the drop-out decisions of others. Therefore if we are going to focus on symmetric equilibria in our
econometric evaluation, we have no choice but to model the bids as if they were submitted in a
sealed-bid auction.
As an interesting aside, we should note that one of the main competitors of eBay, Amazon’s
auction site, extends its auctions beyond the prespeciﬁed closing time until bidding activity ceases26.
This feature changes the analysis above, since the “sealed-bid second-stage” of the auction no longer
exists (T is no longer set, so bidders can not coordinate on the “blind-bidding” period [T − ε,T]).
In this case, “drop-outs” are ﬁnal, since the end of the auction is dependent on bidder activity.
The open-exit ascending auction framework of Milgrom and Weber (1982) can be applied here.
Moreover, under the assumption of aﬃliated signals, it can be shown that the Amazon auction
results in higher expected revenue to the seller than in the symmetric equilibrium of the eBay
auction analyzed above27. Hence Amazon has a more “seller-friendly” mechanism than eBay.
There are other reasons why auction sites might introduce features like this to prevent the type
of “sniping” we observe on eBay. First of all, it would be very diﬃcult to regulate transactions
traﬃc on the Web server if all bids were to come in at the last few minutes of the auction. This
would cause higher congestion and more frequent service outages, driving customers away. Also,
sniping could discourage occasional bidders from entering the auction, since they might not ﬁnd it
worthwhile to wait patiently until the very end of an auction.
So why does eBay stick with its hard-deadline policy? One reason could simply be resistance to
change: since quite a few customers have invested time into deciphering eBay’s system, they might
protest attempts to change the auction mechanism (which was quite recently the case, when eBay
tried, unsuccessfully, to modify its reserve price rules). Another is that hard-deadlines maybe seen
25In fact, we can generalize the above equilibrium to a continuum of “symmetric pooling equilibria” where bidders
with signal x ≥ x∗ bid θ∗ in the ﬁrst stage. However, this cutoﬀ point is very diﬃcult to coordinate on, and zero
seems to be the most likely focal point for such symmetric equilibria.
26More precisely, the auction duration is extended until there are no more bids within a 10 minute period.
27The revenue comparison is between an English auction and a sealed-bid second price auction. See Milgrom and
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beneﬁcial by bidders and sellers with time constraints, in that they prevent auctions from dragging
on. Yet eBay does try to convince bidders that “sniping” is not a strategy they should use. As
we mentioned above, eBay’s bidding tutorial assumes a private values framework and explains that
with private values, the dominant strategy is to bid one’s valuation and sit back.
4.2.2 Bidding in a sealed bid second price auction with a random number of bidders:
Since we are using a sealed bid second price auction as our model of bidding conditional upon
entry, we will develop the bidding strategies in this auction format. If the number of bidders is
common knowledge, then the bid function derived by Milgrom and Weber (1982) applies (recall that
yi =m a x j∈{1,...,n}\i{xj}):
b(x)=E[v|xi = x,yi = y]
=













where fv(v) is the density function of the common value and fx(x|v)a n dFx(x|v) are the condi-
tional density and distribution functions of the signal.
However, as we noted in the section on entry, the number of bidders is not common knowledge
on eBay. The best we can hope for is that bidders have rational expectations about the number of
competitors they are going to face. Therefore we have to introduce this uncertainty into our model
of bidding.
Proposition 3 Let p(n,λ) be the pdf of the number of bidders in the auction conditional upon entry
of particular bidder to the auction.Also deﬁne y
(n)
i =m a x j∈{1,...,n}\i{xj} and v(x,y,n)=E[v|xi =
x,y
(n)
i = y] . Then if the function
b
∗(x,λ)=











is increasing in x, then it is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the common value second price auction
game with a random number of bidders.
Proof 3 See Appendix A.
As can be seen by inspection, the bid function in the case of stochastic bidders is a weighted aver-












So, once the bid functions in the deterministic case are solved for, we can easily compute the bid
function in the stochastic case, using p(n,λ).4 A MODEL OF BIDDING IN EBAY COIN AUCTIONS 24
4.2.3 Properties of the bid function
Although we have the bid function in closed form, to analyze its properties and to use it in a
computational procedure, we still have to evaluate the integrals in the numerator and denominator
numerically. Fortunately, if we assume that v ∼ N(µ,σ2
v)a n dx|v ∼ N(v,kσ2
v),we can compute this
bid function with very high accuracy using the Gauss-Hermite quadrature method (see Judd (1998)
and Stroud and Secrest (1968) for details).
Figure 2plots the bid functions in an auction where are µ =1 ,σ =0 .6a n dk =0 .3. We see
that the functions look quite linear (with a slope of about 0.85) and are indeed increasing in x.
More interestingly, these plots also show that bids are also decreasing in λ, the expected number of
bidders in the auction. So the “winner’s curse” does increase with the number of competitors.
The apparent linearity of the bid functions might raise questions about the validity of the com-
putational procedure or whether there is a theoretical result remaining to be proved about the
behavior of bid functions under the distributional we have made. To answer the ﬁrst question, we
have repeated our calculations for an increasing number of quadrature points, and, instead of us-
ing the Gauss-Hermite quadrature evaluation points, have also tried simulating the integrals. Both
methods gave similar results. As to whether it can theoretically be shown whether the bid functions
are linear, we have only been able to verify that linearity holds only in the (deterministic number
of bidders) case when n =2 . In this case, the bid function is:




It could be conjectured, then, that as the number of bidders gets larger, the departure from
linearity remains slight.
Another “linearity” property that we did succeed in verifying theoretically is that bid functions
scale linearly when the signal distribution undergoes a linear transformation. That is:
Proposition 4 Let b(x|µo,σo,k,λ) be the bid function in an auction where the common value v is
distributed normally with mean µo and standard deviation σo. We claim that in an auction where
the common value is distributed with mean r1µo + r2 and standard deviation r1σo,the equilibrium
bid function is r1b(r1x + r2|µo,σo,k,λ)+r2. That is, if it was optimal to bid b w i t has i g n a lx in
the original auction with the common value distributed N(µo,σo), it is now optimal to bid r1b + r2
when your signal is r1x + r2, with the common value distributed N(r1µo + r2,r 1σo).
Proof 4 See Appendix A.
Observe that the above argument depends only on the linearity of the expectation of the common
value given other bidder’s signals, and the existence of monotonic bid functions. Therefore, we can4 A MODEL OF BIDDING IN EBAY COIN AUCTIONS 25
extend this result to any auction where bidder signals are distributed according to a location-scale
family, and where the common value or the expectation of the common value is a linear function of
the bidders’ signals.
This is a key result in our estimation procedure, because it allows us to compute the bid function
only once for a base-case auction. We can then apply an aﬃne transformation to this “pre-computed”
function to ﬁnd the bid function in an auction where the distribution of the common value has a
diﬀerent mean and variance.
It is worthwhile to note that bid functions will be likewise linearly scalable in many commonly
studied auctions, such as the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction. Elyakime et al. (1994) note that eﬃcient
evalution of the bid function is a key problem in structural estimation of auction models. The
simpliﬁcation we propose can be used to for structural estimation in a wide variety of models where
the bid function is linearly scalable and the distribution of valuations is characterized by its ﬁrst
two moments.
4.2.4 Minimum bids
eBay allows the seller to set a minimum bid. Since minimum bids induce truncation on the set of
bids (and hence valuations) we observe, it is necessary to incorporate the truncation region in our
likelihood function.
However, in the case of a minimum bid r, equilibrium strategies are derived by Milgrom and
Weber to be:
b(x)=v(x,x)f o rx ≥ x
∗
b(x) <r for x<x ∗28
where x∗ = x∗(r) is called the screening level and is given by
x
∗(r)=i n f {E[v|xi = x,yi <x ] ≥ r}












We calculate x∗ for a string of values of r and use interpolation to ﬁnd x∗ in our likelihood
function evaluations.
For the case of a stochastic number of bidders, the above equilibrium generalizes to:4 A MODEL OF BIDDING IN EBAY COIN AUCTIONS 26
b(x,λ)=










for x ≥ x∗
b(x,λ)=0 f o r x<x ∗ (2)
where x∗ is the expected screening level
x∗(r,λ)=i n f {ENE[v|xi = x,xi <x ,N= n] ≥ r}
which can be calculated as the solution of:
p(1,λ)E[v|x]+













Once again, normality assumptions allow us to compute the integrals in the above expressions
with very high accuracy using the Gaussian quadrature method. However, we also need to solve for
x∗ in expression (3) using a numerical procedure. We use a simple Newton-Raphson algorithm to
ﬁnd this solution.
Figure 3 plots the screening level as a function of the minimum bid for the auction with µ =
1,σ =0 .6a n dk =0 .3. The screening level appears to depend on the minimum bid in a similar
near-linear fashion. From the two cases, λ =3a n dλ =5 , that are plotted in this ﬁgure, we also
see that the screening level is decreasing in λ and, as shown by Milgrom and Weber (1982), is above
the minimum bid.
4.2.5 Secret Reserve Prices
We will use a shortcut in modelling the eﬀect of a secret reserve price on bidding behavior: we will
assume that bidders believe that the seller’s valuation for the item comes from the same information
structure as theirs, i.e. the seller is yet another bidder. This makes sense if the seller has good
enough outside options, i.e. she’s not constrained to sell the item immediately, or on eBay. Since
quite a few sellers on eBay are professional coin traders, this condition is likely to be satisﬁed.
With this assumption, the only diﬀerence between the secret reserve price auction and a regular
auction is that now potential bidders know that they face at least one competitor, the seller, so now:
bSR(x,λ)=











A minimum bid is similarly incorporated into the secret reserve price setting. The screening
level, x∗SR(r,λ) in this case is the solution of:5 STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL 27













5 Structural Estimation of the Model
In order to make predictions using the above model, we need to compute the bid functions for a set
of “reasonable” parameter values. The problem is that the “structural parameters” of our model,
i.e. the parameters of the prior density of the common value fv(v) and the conditional density
of bidders’ signals, fx(x|v),are not observable from data. The next section outlines a structural
estimation method to uncover these unobservables from data.
5.1 Speciﬁcation of the information structure and entry process
We will assume that the prior distribution on the common value and the conditional distributions
of bidders’ signals are normally distributed. The normality assumption is motivated not only by
its computational convenience, but also from an inspection of the bid distribution (normalized by
book value) in Figure 4, which resembles a normal distribution fairly well. We specify the prior
distribution of the common value in auction t to be N(µt,σ2
t), where:
µt = µt(β,BOOKV ALt,BLEMISH t)( 6 )
= β1BOOKV ALt + β2BLEMISHtBOOKV ALt − 2.18
σt = σt(β,BOOKV ALt,BLEMISH t)( 7 )
= β3BOOKV ALt + β4BLEMISHtBOOKV ALt
This choice for modeling the common value is motivated in part by our reduced form ﬁnds that
objects with a blemish are sold at a discount in the auction. Also, since agents must pay shipping
and handling fees, we subtract $2.18 in computing µt, the average shipping and handling fee for the
mint/proof sets29. The parameter vector β =( β1,β 2,β 3,β 4) is held constant across all auctions
and all bidders so that identiﬁcation of these parameters is possible.
The distribution of individual signals conditional on the common value is N(vt,kσ2
t)w h e r ek = β5
is a parameter to be estimated. This parameter models the uncertainty in the private signals. In
the case where k = 0, we have the private values situation. We hold k constant across auctions for
identiﬁcation.
29Our data on shipping and handling has a lot of missing values, so we chose not to use the individual values.5 STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL 28
We use a reduced form speciﬁcation for λt,the Poisson parameter for entry, motivated by the
regression in Table 3. In order to avoid negative values of λt , we use its log as the dependent
variable:









The equilibrium bid functions we derived in the previous sections generate a likelihood function in
a natural way. Let Ωt be shorthand for {λt,SECRET t,r t}; the Poisson parameter for auction t,the
auction type, and, the minimum bid. Then b(x|v,σt,k,Ωt) denotes the equilibrium bid function
given a particular (unobserved) realization of the common value, the variance of the conditional
distribution of the bidder’s signal and the information contained in Ωt.
Assuming that the bids in our dataset are generated by equilibrium bidding, we can calculate the
distribution of the unobserved signals given the observed distribution of bids. Let φ(b|v,σt,k,Ωt)
denote the inverse bid function, mapping the observed bid to the unobserved individual signal x.
Then fb(bi|v,σt,k,Ωt), the probability that player i submits a bid bi in auction t is:
fb(bi|v,σt,k,Ωt)=fx(φ(bi|v,σt,k,Ωt)) φ (bi|v,σt,k,Ωt) (10)
Unfortunately, neither the inverse bid function φ(.) nor its derivative φ (.) are available in closed
form for the auctions we consider. In Appendix B, we outline a computational procedure to evaluate
φ(bi|v,σt,k,Ωt),φ  (bi|v,σt,k,Ωt) eﬃciently.
To ﬁnd the likelihood for the observed bids b =( b1,...,bnt) it is necessary to account for the fact
that the bi are correlated through the realization of v. Also, remember that for the winning bidder,
we do not observe the bid directly, but his payment. Then in an auction where there is no minimum









O b s e r v et h a tw ea l s ot ot o o ki n t oa c c o u n tt h a tnt bidders showed up as a result of a stochastic5 STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION OF THE MODEL 29
process, by adding in p(nt|λt) 30.
In an auction with a minimum bid, we have to take into account that some entrants might have
drawn signals that are lower than the screening level x∗(λt,r t) and hence have not submitted a bid.
f(b1,b 2,...,bn|µt,σ t,Ωt) (11)
=









where 1{nt ≥ 1} is an indicator variable for at least one bidder in the auction and ¯ N is an upper
bound on the number of entrants.31 Observe that this speciﬁcation allows us to assign positive
likelihood to auctions with no bidders.
For auctions with a secret reserve price, the likelihood function in (11) should reﬂect the fact
that bidders assume that seller is another competitor (who is certain to be there) and that they use
a diﬀerent bid function because of this assumption:
f(b1,b 2,...,bn|µt,σ t,Ωt) (13)
=
















Our econometric approach will be Bayesian. As Hendricks and Paarsch (1995) point out, many
auction models generate likelihood functions that do not have standard asymptotics and therefore
30We assume that with a zero reserve price the probability of not bidding conditional upon entering the auction is
zero. That is, bidders always draw high enough valuations after they’ve incurred the bid preparation cost to make
bidding worthwhile. Correcting for truncation at zero slows down the computation of the likelihood function, and
does not change the results discernibly.
31With a Poisson process, ¯ N = ∞. But this makes it impossible to account for the truncation in bids due to the
reserve price, hence we take ¯ N to be a large enough number so that the diﬀerence between the truncated Poisson
distribution and the full distribution is negligible. We found that ¯ N = 30 is good enough for the range of λ sw e
consider.6R E S U L T S 30
large sample approaches to inference are diﬃcult to implement econometrically. We will counter
the classical objection to the arbitrariness of Bayesian priors with the following: there are over 1000
observed bids in the data set and the likelihood function will therefore have considerably more weight
than the prior in forming the posterior.
For the purposes of this analysis we will impose ﬂat priors with bounded support on the vector
of parameters {β1,..,β10}.L e t
Xt = {SECRETt,BOOKV ALt,BLEMISH t,NEGATIVE t,MINBID t}
be the auction-speciﬁc data vector and p(β|BIDSt,X t) denote the posterior distribution of the
vector of parameters β conditional upon the observed data. By Bayes theorem:
p(β|BIDSt,X t) ∝ p(β)L(BID|β,Xt)
That is, the posterior is proportional to the prior times the likelihood function. In general, we are
interested in moments of β or functions of β; and these can be computed by averaging over the






βp(β)L(BIDSt|β,Xt) dβ  
p(β)L(BIDSt|β,Xt) dβ
Unfortunately, the integrals in the numerator and denominator are diﬃcult to evaluate analyt-
ically except in a very limited class of conjugate prior/likelihood families. Our likelihood function
and priors certainly do not fall within this class. However, recent work in Bayesian econometrics has
developed methods to the simulate draws from the posterior distribution, so that the integrals in the
numerator and the denominator can be evaluated using Monte-Carlo simulation. In this research we
will use a variant of a Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, which is discussed in Geweke (1996). Details
of the algorithm are discussed in Appendix C.
6R e s u l t s
Table 8 reports the results of our simulations of the posterior distribution of β for our structural
model. All results are from a posterior simulation of 30,000 draws with an initial “burn-in” of 10,000
draws. Convergence to the posterior appeared to be rapid.
These parameter values translate into the following inferences:6R E S U L T S 31
Table 8: Posterior Means and Standard Deviations of Structural Parameters
Parameter Mean Std. Dev. p-value32
β1 0.9911 0.0387 1.0
β2 -0.1446 0.1628 0.7820
β3 0.5599 0.0260 1.0
β4 0.0326 0.0260 0.9402
β5 0.2545 0.0259 1.0
β6 1.4069 0.0897 1.0
β7 -0.2857 0.1080 1.0
β8 0.0883 0.0276 1.0
β9 -0.0414 0.0228 0.9684
β10 -0.2514 0.3268 0.6146
β11 -0.7893 0.0864 1.0
• The information structure: Bidders have a mean valuation that is almost equal to the bookvalue
of the item. Reported blemishes do not seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on this valuation. The
standard deviation of the prior distribution on the value of the item is 56% of the bookvalue. A
blemish increases this variance by 3%. However, bidders’ signals (conditional on the realization
of the common value) are more precise. Since k = β5 =0 .2545, the standard deviation of the
conditional distribution of bidders’ signals is
√
kσv =28 .25% of the bookvalue.
• Entry: Given equation (8), the reserve price mechanism, minimum bid level in an ordinary
auction and the bookvalue of the coin appear as the main determinants of entry to the auction.
Negative seller reputation also reduces entry. The minimum bid level in a secret reserve price
auction does not aﬀect the entry decision signiﬁcantly.
To help interpret our estimates, we’ll walk through the decision process of a typical bidder on
eBay: a potential bidder will ﬁrst peruse auction listings for a while, selecting the auction(s) in
which she might be willing to participate. She will then read the item description and most likely
consult a handy reference like the Oﬃcial Red Book or Coins magazine to get a sense of the book
value of the item. This process, we believe, will take an experienced coin collector no more than a
minute or so. As a result the bidder will have formed a “prior” on the distribution of the value of
the object. We ﬁnd that the observed bids can be justiﬁed by our model of bidding if this “prior”
distribution has a mean that is equal the bookvalue of the item and has a standard deviation that
is 56% of the book value.
We infer from our estimates that published book values do indeed provide point estimates for
how the coins are valued on the market33. There is, however, considerable uncertainty about the
33The fact that reported blemishes do not seem to change this valuation signiﬁcantly stems from the fact that most6R E S U L T S 32
value of the coin set about its book value. As we described in the data section, mint/proof sets
comprise of uncirculated coins, and any adulteration by the seller would cause the set to lose all its
value. Since bidders do not have the opportunity to inspect the items ﬁrst hand, we believe such an
a priori quality uncertainty is plausible34.
After the prior is formed in the bidder’s mind, she will decide whether to invest the time to
submit a bid. This decision will depend on the amount of proﬁt she expects to make, which, in
turn depends on the bookvalue of the item, the number of competitors she expects to face, the
reputation of the seller and the minimum-bid/reserve price policy set by the seller, as captured by
the speciﬁcation in equation (8). If she decides that it is worth the while to submit a bid in a
particular auction, the bidder will enter what we deem a “costly bid preparation” stage. This is
the stage where bidders reﬁne their estimate of the value of the coin, by investigating relevant coin
prices and market conditions further, and in almost all cases, augmenting any “objective estimate”
by introspection. Of course, the amount of eﬀort sunk into preparing a bid will depend on the stakes
involved, and is likely to be diﬀerent for a $5 coin and a $3000 coin.
We ﬁnd that the reﬁned estimate of bidders is sharper than the “prior,” and the uncertainty
about the resale value of the object is reduced to about one third of the book value. Given that bid
functions for the estimated parameter values are nearly linear and have a slope of about 0.9, this
estimate means that bids within an auction should be dispersed with a standard deviation of about
26% of book value.
To gauge the degree of ﬁt our model achieves, we simulated the auctions in our data set using
our parameter estimates. That is, given the auction speciﬁc variables, we generated nt signals for
each auction t,w h e r ent was generated by the estimated entry process. We then computed the bid
functions corresponding to the signals. The top two plots in Figure 5 compares the simulated and
actual bid distributions.
Although the mean value of the bid distributions seem to match (the mean for the simulated
distribution is 82.7% of the bookvalue, compared to 83% for the actual data), Figure 5 tells us that
our estimate of the variance of cross-auction heterogeneity (β3 in particular) is higher than what
seems apparent in the data. The bottom plot in Figure 5 is the simulated distribution of bids when
we set β3 =0 .3. This seems to match the actual bid distribution better.
In interpreting the above plots, we should bear in mind that looking at Figure 5 alone does not
tell anything about within-auction dispersion of bids. However, our empirical speciﬁcation attempts
to match the within-auction dispersion of bids alongside the cross-auction dispersion. Figure 6 is a
histogramof the simulated and actual dispersion of bids. We ﬁnd that the mean dispersion (diﬀerence
between max and min) of the simulated bids is 23% of book value. This is lower than the actual
of these “blemishes” were minor details concerning the condition of the container of the coin set, rather than the coins
themselves.
34In fact, our “proﬁt” ﬁgures in section 3.4 only make sense if there is considerable uncertainty about the value of
the object about its book value.6R E S U L T S 33
dispersion of bids, which was found to be 32%. Hence we see that in trying to match all moments of
the data, our speciﬁcation has to make a tradeoﬀ between overstatingcross-auctionheterogeneity and
understating within-auction heterogeneity. We believe adding explicit consideration of unobserved
heterogeneity into our econometric speciﬁcation will help achieve a tighter ﬁt; however, such an
exercise would greatly complicate the estimation procedure, and is beyond the scope of this paper.
To evaluate our parameter estimates for the entry process, we compare them with the results in
Table 3 in section 3.2. The signs of the coeﬃcients on the independent variables seem to be in accord.
The diﬀerence between the estimates in that regression and parameter estimates for speciﬁcation (8)
is that the dependent variable in Table 3 is the observed number of bidders whereas our structural
model speciﬁes the expected number of bidders as the dependent variable. When we predict the
expected number of bidders using our estimates, we ﬁnd that on average 3.3 bidders were expected
to show up. Since we allowed for the fact that some bidders may be “screened out” by the minimum
bid even after they decide to participate in the auction, it makes sense that the expected number of
bidders is higher than the average of the observed number of bidders, which we found to be 3.05.
Using our parameter estimates, we calculated that the expected number of bidders in secret
reserve price auctions is, on average, 3.9, as opposed to 3.2bidders in ordinary auctions. Hence the
intuition that secret reserve prices can be used to induce entry is justiﬁed. An interesting diﬀerence
of the parameter results in Table 8 from the results in Table 3 is that entry to secret reserve price
auctions is that we ﬁnd that bidders do react negatively to the existence of a secret reserve price
(β7 is negative and signiﬁcant, as opposed to the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient on SECRET in Table 3).
This also makes sense from the standpoint of a rational bidder deciding whether to enter an auction:
even though ex-ante expected proﬁt may be higher due to the lower minimum bid in secret reserve
price auction, there is still a probability that the highest bidder will not win the auction. Hence
entry incentives should be curbed somewhat due to the presence of a secret reserve price.
We should point out that our structural estimates of the entry process are driven entirely by bid
data; nowhere in the estimation process do we directly impose the condition that the “expected”
entry process should resemble the actual entry process. The “ﬁt” of the structural model to the
observed entry process could be improved by adding such an auxiliary condition; however, even
without imposing this condition we manage to get realistic results.
6.1 How big is the winner’s curse?
Recall that the measure of the “winner’s curse” we used in section 3.1 was the amount a bidder
would lower her bid when she believed that there would be an extra bidder in the auction. Plots of
the bid function in Figure 2conﬁrm that, at least within the conﬁnes of our modelling framework,
bid levels should decline with an increase in expected competition.
To assess the size of the winner’s curse in our sample, we computed the bid function in a6R E S U L T S 34
“representative auction” whose characteristics are set at the sample averages reported in Table 1.
The bid functions for the “representative auction” and the auction with one extra expected bidder
are plotted in Figure 7. We ﬁnd that an additional bidder decreases bids by $1.50 in this $47 auction.
In other words, the “winner’s curse” reduces bids by 3.2% for every additional competitor in the
auction.
The bid function in the representative auction is once again very close to being linear and has a
slope of 0.9, with an intercept of -0.85. Therefore, with an estimate at the book value of the object
($47), the bid should be $41.5. This is $5.5 less than the bid in a private values auction. Hence we
see that “common values” plays an important role in the transactions in this market.
To see how reducing the uncertainty about the value of the object aﬀects the bids, we plot the
bid function for the case where the standard deviation of v is only 10% of book value (as opposed
to 52%). As expected, the bids increase: for an estimate of $47, the bid is now $45. This is about
a 7% gain! So the seller deﬁnitely has an incentive to reduce the uncertainty about the value of the
coin set.
6.2 Cost of entry into an eBay auction
An interesting exercise we can perform using our parameter estimates is to try to calculate the entry
or “bid-preparation” cost that would rationalize the stochastic entry process we observe. Such a cost
will be borne by serious bidders who expend time and eﬀort into formulating a good estimate of the
value of the coin set and ﬁnding a proﬁt maximizing bid. This might be a useful fact to know for
sellers trying to prepare description pages for their auctions, as giving adequate information about
the object for sale would help reduce this cost and induce entry.
To do this we use the framework developed by Levin and Smith (1994) to analyze auctions with
endogeneous entry. In this framework, n out of N bidders decide to enter an auction before they
observe their private signal. Contingent on entry, each bidder bears a bid-preparation cost c. Levin
and Smith (1994) ﬁnd that there exists a symmetric equilibrium of the endogenous entry game in
which each bidder enters the auction with an identical probability p. Observe that if this probability
is low enough and the number of potential bidders is high enough – conditions likely to be satisﬁed
on eBay– then the Poisson entry process we assumed above is justiﬁed.
What is the process through which this entry probability is determined? Levin and Smith (1994)
argue that entry will occur until each bidder’s ex-ante proﬁt from entering the auction is zero.
More speciﬁcally, let V be the ex-ante expected value of the item, and Wn be the ex-ante expected
payment the winning bidder will make to the seller. Then a bidder’s expected proﬁt, conditional
on entering an auction with n bidders is (V − Wn)/n − c, since all bidders are ex-ante symmetric.
Deﬁne Tn(r) to be the probability of trade given n and minimum bid (or reserve price) r, and pi
n
be the probability that there are n bidders in the auction from the perspective of the ith potential
bidder, conditional on herself being one of the bidders. Assuming all other bidders are following the6R E S U L T S 35














(n−1)! , n =1 ,...∞.
We can get a feel for the entry cost to the eBay auctions by computing the above expression for
the “representative auction” we considered in the previous section. One complication is that Wn
and Tn(r) are ex-ante expected values that are not available in closed form. Therefore we use the
following simulation method:
1. Using a Poisson(λ) distribution, draw K realizations of {n1,...,nK}, the number of bidders in
as e r i e so fK auctions.
2.G i v e n nk, draw nk signals {x1,....,xnk} from the conditional distribution f(x|v), whose pa-
rameters were estimated previously.
3. Given these signals, compute the bid corresponding to the second highest signal. This will, in
the case where the reserve price r is exceeded, give the payment W
(k)
n for the kth auction in
our simulation.
4. Compute the average 1
K
  (V −W
(k)
n )
nk to get an estimate for c, the cost of entry.
Performing this simulation procedure using 20000 draws, we get that the entry cost implied in
the “representative auction” is $3.2035. This is about 6.8% of the bookvalue ($47) in this auction
and it is comparable to the shipping and handling cost.
This “estimate” of the entry cost will change with auction characteristics. However, the entry
cost as a percentage of the bookvalue seems very stable. For example, for an auction with bookvalue
$1000 and a minimum bid of $600, the computed entry cost was found to be $66, which is 6.6% of
the bookvalue.
A 6-7% entry cost can be quite signiﬁcant if the book value of the item is high. Therefore, it
might advisable for sellers of high value items to try and reduce this cost by giving out as much
information about the item as possible, by providing pictures, certiﬁcates of authenticity, or a report
from an oﬃcial coin grading agency like PCGS (Professional Coin Grading Service)36.
6.3 Reserve Price Policy
35The number of simulation draws was enough to ensure that the standard deviation of this number was less than
0.05.
36PCGS charges $30 for its regular grading service with 21 days of turnaround time.6R E S U L T S 36
We can use a similar simulation framework to calculate the expected revenue of the seller under
diﬀerent reserve price policies. As we noted in section 3.2, entry patterns in our data set reveal a
beneﬁt of a secret reserve price mechanism over a public reserve price mechanism. The intuition we
gave to this beneﬁt was that the seller can induce entry to her auction by setting the minimum bid
low, but still manage to extract a higher revenue by keeping her secret reserve price high.
This intuition might not be quite correct given our modelling assumptions for handling the secret
reserve price auction. If bidders regard the seller as yet another bidder, then because of the winner’s
curse eﬀect, they will shade their bids downward to take this extra bidder into account. Hence,
regarding expected revenues, the seller trades oﬀ this winner’s curse eﬀect against the beneﬁt of
having more bidders in the auction.
To gauge the validity of this intuition, we run the following simulation exercise: we ﬁx the reserve
price at a constant fraction of the book value (we choose this fraction to be 85%, a reasonable guess
for a typical secret reserve price). Then for diﬀerent book values, we simulate both an auction with
the minimum bid set at 85% of book value, and a secret reserve price auction with a minimum bid
of zero and secret reserve price at 85% of book value. In the simulations, we use our parameter
estimates for the signal distribution and the entry process, and aside from the book value, we set
all other independent variables equal to the sample averages.
Figure 8 reveals that the intuition is correct. For all bookvalues that we considered, expected
revenue from a secret reserve price exceeds the revenue from an ordinary auction where the minimum
bid is set at the same level as the secret reserve price. Hence we can conclude that the beneﬁt of
additional entry outweighs the winner’s curse eﬀect.
Figure 9 plots the sale probabilities (as a function of book value) for the two auction formats.
The beneﬁt of additional entry into the auction is once again apparent; although bidders might
lower their bids to account for the fact that the seller is eﬀectively an extra bidder, inducing more
entry by setting a low minimum bid level enhances the probability that a bidder with a high-enough
signal will participate.
Looking at Figure 8, we see that a bookvalue of about $40 will amortize the $1 cost of registering
the auction as a secret reserve price auction. However, the secret reserve price fee is refundable if
the auction is successful, so the expected cost of setting a secret reserve price auction is actually
about 30 cents. This expected cost is amortized if the bookvalue is about $10. So a $10 book value
emerges as the lower bound to having a secret reserve price auction. Recall that in section 3.2we
found that secret reserve prices are used for higher book value items37.
In light of these simulations, our recommendation to the sellers is to use a secret reserve price
auction if the item has high enough value, and to set the minimum bid very low to induce entry.
As we noted before, this strategy has indeed been discovered by eBay users, and even eBay itself
recommends sellers to set a low minimum bid when they are running a secret reserve price auction.
37Even though we do observe the use of secret reserve price for sub-$10, there might be an alternative explanation
for this. See footnote 15 in section 3.3.7C O N C L U S I O N 37
7C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have analyzed a data set from eBay coin auctions to investigate the determinants
of bidder and seller behavior. Our main empirical ﬁndings are the following:
1. The eBay coin auctions that we analyze ﬁt a common values framework better than a pri-
vate values framework. Observed bidder behavior departs signiﬁcantly from what would be
expected from a private values auction. However, eBay’s mechanism design philosophy seems
to rely on the private values assumption. Since bidder and seller behavior can vary signiﬁ-
cantly depending on whether private or common values are at play, we would caution eBay
administrators in forming their site and mechanism design policies.
2. Our structural estimation results allowed us to quantify the “winner’s curse eﬀect” associated
with the existence of common values. We ﬁnd that the expectation of one additional bidder
auction decreases bids by 3.2% in a representative auction. Also, in this representative auction,
bids are 10% lower than bidders’ estimate of the value of the coin set.
3. Entry into an auction seems to play a very important role in determining revenues. The entry
patterns we observe seem to be in accord with a setting in which forming an intelligent bid,
after observing auction listings, is a costly activity. Hence, bidders enter auctions in which
they are likely to be successful. Since a high minimum bid reduces the ex-ante expected proﬁt
of a potential bidder, it reduces the incentive to spend time and eﬀort to enter the auction.
Hence minimum bids are the most signiﬁcant determinant of entry into the auction. We also
ﬁnd that higher book value coins attract more bidders, most likely because the dollar value of
expected proﬁts increase.
4. Since entry depends crucially on the minimum bid level, one strategy for the seller is to set a
low minimum bid and a secret reserve price. Although bidders do account for the fact that
there is a secret reserve price, we ﬁnd that the sellers using this strategy are able to increase
entry to an auction and still manage to guarantee a high selling price. We ﬁnd that for a given
reserve price, using the secret reserve price strategy yields the seller higher expected proﬁts.
We also ﬁnd that the secret reserve price strategy should be reserved for higher book value
items, since eBay charges a fee to use a secret reserve price.
Along the way, we have also made methodological contributions to the empirical auction lit-
erature. For example, to our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study in the literature that incorporates
the eﬀect of entry explicitly into its econometric speciﬁcation. By devising an eﬃcient method to
compute the bid function for a common value auction, we have also managed to reduce the com-
putational requirements of our estimation procedure. Since this method is easily generalizable to
other auction models, we believe future researchers can beneﬁt from our ﬁndings when building and
estimating parametric structural models of auctions.7C O N C L U S I O N 38
We believe that eBay remains a fertile ground for empirical auction research. For example, we
have not explicitly taken into account the “multi-market” nature of eBay, and have treated each
auction in isolation. As we mentioned, in the market we studied, very often identical or very similar
goods were being sold side-by-side or back-to-back. We have also realized that many sellers have
more than one object to sell. Hence eBay provides an ideal testing ground for the exploration of the
impact of “temporal” or “spatial” bidder and seller strategies in multi-market settings38.S i n c ew e
also observe signiﬁcant variation among seller’s choices of minimum bids and reserve prices, there
is also room to test theories of competition between sellers (Peters and Severinov (1997), McAfee
(1993)).
We also believe possible extensions to our work can be made in the setting we have examined.
For example, in our structural speciﬁcation, we have not modeled the sequential nature of entry,
and have assumed that the entry decision is made simultaneously. Relaxing this assumption could
open the way to dynamic, rather than static, bidding strategies that can be taken to the data.
We have also assumed away any consideration of asymmetries between bidders or errors in decision
making, although asymmetries and error-prone decision-making can alter the empirical implications
of auction models signiﬁcantly.
38For example, the per unit shipping and handling costs for a bidder declines if she wins multiple auctions from the
same seller. Hence her bidding strategy across diﬀerent auctions might not completely separable.A APPENDIX 39
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 3
Without loss of generality, focus on the decision of bidder 1. Suppose the bidders j  = i adopt
strategies bj = b∗(xj,λ). Then the highest bid among them, conditional on there being n bidders,
will be W (n) =m a x 2≤j≤n bj(xj). Since b∗ is increasing in x, W (n) = b∗(y
(n)
1 ) and the expected
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and fv(v|x) is the posterior density of the common value given the signal.
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to b yields:
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solving, we get b∗(x,λ)a sa b o v e .
A.2 Proof of proposition 4
The easiest way to see why this should hold true is to look at the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)
utility of a particular bidder i (the payoﬀ given that other bidders submit bids that are monotonic
in their signals, x−i, and conditional on the number of competitors n):





− max{b−i(x−i)} if bi > max{b−i(x−i)}





n+k is the posterior mean of the unknown common value, given all bidders’ signals.
The objective function that bidder i maximizes is the expectation of the above vNM utility, and the
bid he submits is the maximizer.
bi =a r g m a x EnEx−iui(bi,b −i,x i,x −i,n) (15)






The bid that maximizes bidder i’s expected utility in an auction where the signals are scaled linearly
as r1x + r2, and where all other bidders follow linearly scaled strategies r1b−i(x−i)+r2 is:
b
 
i =a r g m a x EnEr1x−i+r2ui(b
 
i,r 1b−i(x−i)+r2,r 1xi + r2,r 1x−i + r2,n)




























r1 = bi, i.e. b 
i = r1bi + r2.
Hence the bids follow the same linear transformation that the signals are scaled with.
B Numerical computation of the inverse bid function
Likelihood function evaluations require that we ﬁnd the value of the inverse bid function φ for each
bid in auction t. Since a closed form expression for the inverse bid function does not exist, this
potentially means that we will have to evaluate the bid function b(x|µt,σ t,k,λt)a tl e a s taf e wt i m e s
for each bid to ﬁnd the inverse of b(.) using a numerical algorithm like Newton-Raphson. However,
as we found out while working out the closed forms for equilibrium bid functions, this requires the
numerical evaluation of integrals. This is a costly step since we have to evaluate the full-likelihood
about 30,000 times in our posterior simulation, and with 1500 bids in the data, the integrals would
have to be evaluated at least 45 million times.
To reduce the computational complexity, we ﬁrst exploit the linearity property of the bid func-
tions. Recall that linearity implies that if b(x|µo,σo,k,λ) is a pure strategy equilibrium bid function
to the auction where the common value is distributed normally with mean µo and standard devia-
tion σo,t h e nr1b(r1x + r2|µo,σo,k,λ)+r2 is the equilibrium bid function in the auction where the
common value is distributed with mean r1µo + r2 and standard deviation r1σo. This result holds
regardless of whether there is a known or random number of bidders in the auction. Similarly, if
there is a posted reserve price in the auction, we can apply the linear transformation to the screen-
ing level x∗(R,λ,k). That is, if x∗(R;µo,σo,λ,k) is the screening level in the original auction, then
r1x∗(r1R + r;|µo,σo,k,λ)+r2 will be the screening level in the transformed auction.C ESTIMATION 41
How does linearity help us? Suppose at a particular evaluation of the likelihood function, the
distributional parameters are {µt,σt} for auction t. Then we do not have to evaluate b(x|µt,σ t,k,λ):
setting r1t = σt
σo and r2t = µt, − r1tµo, we interpolate the value of b(x−r2t
r1t |µo,σo,k,λ)f r o mas e t
of pre-computed values, and return r1tb(x−r2t
r1t |µo,σo,k,λ)+r2t
39. Assuming the interpolation is
good enough, this scheme lets us avoid computing the Nash equilibrium in the course of likelihood
function evaluations. The equilibrium is solved beforehand for a normalized set of parameter values,
and adapted to the parameter values generated by the posterior simulation routine.
As for inverting the bid function, one can use a simple algorithm like Newton-Raphson with
relative ease, since the bid function is monotonic, and b(x)=x is usually a good starting value.
Alternatively, one can evaluate b(x|µo,σo,k,λ) on the grid used for interpolation, and instead of
using polynomial interpolation to ﬁnd b as a function of x,k,λ,one can use polynomial interpolation
to evaluate x as a function of b,k,λ. This allows one to approximate the inverse bid function directly,
instead of having to evaluate the bid function several times until Newton-Raphson converges. In
fact, this method is much more eﬃcient in terms of calculating the derivative of the inverse bid
function (the Jacobian), since the derivative of the polynomial interpolation can be written out in
closed form, and once again, be evaluated in one step.
C Estimation
C.1 Priors
Let p(β) denote the prior distribution on the parameters. We assume that the prior is proportional
to a constant if
0 <β 1 < 3
−2 <β 2 < 2
0 <β 3 < 2
−2 <β 4 < 2
0 <β 5 < 4
0 <β 6,7,8,9,10 < 5
and is equal to zero otherwise. We impose these ﬂat priors to minimize the eﬀect of prior choice
39The computational simpliﬁcation from linearity can be exploited fully only when we have precomputed values
for all possible values of x,k and λ. Since this is not possible in a computational setting, we precompute the
bid function for the ”base-case” auction (where the CV is distributed N(µo,σo)) at a large number grid points
x ∈{ xo,x 1,...,xNk},k ∈{ ko,k 1,...kNk},λ ∈{ λo,...,λNλ} and perform a polynomial interpolation to calculate
b(
x−r2t
r1t |µo,σo,k,λ) at intermediate values. We took care to restrict the domain of interpolation to a region that is
a rather tight cover of the region covered by simulation draws to ensure good performance.C ESTIMATION 42
on the shape of the posterior distribution. As for the appropriateness of the cutoﬀ points, we made
sure that these contained the ”reasonable bounds” for the possible realizations of the parameters.
C.2 Posterior simulation
In this section we givean outline of the variant of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm that we used
to simulate the posterior distribution of the parameters. The goal of this algorithm is to draw a
sequence of random vectors β0,β1,β2... from the posterior distribution. The algorithm starts out
by ﬁnding a rough approximation to the posterior mode of which we will refer to as βo. Let H be
the Hessian matrix of the posterior distribution at βo. The algorithm starts with the ﬁrst element
in the sequence as βo and is deﬁned inductively as follows:
1. Given βn draw a candidate value   β from a normal distribution with mean βn and variance-
covariance matrix -H−1.
2.L e t




3. Set βn+1 =   β with probability α.
4. Return to 1.
Intuitively, the algorithm simulates a Markovchain (or a randomwalk) starting from the posterior
mode, which under certain stationarity conditions, converges to an invariant distribution. Geweke
(1996)provides suﬃcient conditions for the invariant distribution of this chain to be the posterior
distribution. It is easy to check that these conditions are met in this application.REFERENCES 43
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Bid functions for the representative auction
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Histogram of simulated bids/bookval













Histogram of simulated bids/bookval, beta(3)=0.3REFERENCES 48
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Histogram of within auction bid dispersion −− simulated








Histogram of within auction bid dispersion −− actual
Figure 8: Expected revenue diﬀerence between secret and posted reserve schemes




































Figure 9: Sale probabilities for secret and posted reserve schemes
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